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DISRUPTING ADHESION CONTRACTS WITH
#METOO INNOVATORS
Xuan-Thao Nguyen
Adhesion contracts are everywhere. Take it or leave it, the dominant party holds the leverage while the weaker party adheres.
Ninety percent of employment contracts contain mandatory arbitration clauses, and attempts to challenge arbitration requirements meet with judicial indifference or hostility. Ultimately, arbitration clauses eviscerate the employee's right to a jury trial
and access to the court system in general. In recent years, employers in the tech sector have faced unexpected resistancefrom
innovators. Just as innovators are known for disrupting old
business models through technological innovations, #MeToo reformers are disrupting the seemingly insurmountable adhesion
contract regime. They organize, protest,demand, and seize back
their constitutionaland substantive rights. Leveraging their talent capitalpower in the tech sector, the innovators achieve results. Their efforts have led to businesses removing their arbitration clauses, as these pioneers regain their rights without relying
on the conventional contracttheory of unconscionability.
INTRODUCTION
NNOVATORS in the tech sector are often affluent tech employees
who possess the tech evangelist's view that a technologist has the ability to change the world.' The tech culture fosters a collaborative working
environment for brainstorming ideas, creating designs, and embracing
innovation. But that very culture perpetuated a toxic environment of
sexual harassment and misconduct, where the victims faced demotion or
pressure to depart, while sexual predators received large payouts, accel2
erated to new opportunities, or obtained fresh new capital funding.
When the #MeToo movement erupted in other sectors, women in tech
spoke out, started organizing, and initiated their own social disruption.
These women focused their efforts on contracts of adhesion. Employment agreements in tech and elsewhere are standard form, take-it-orleave-it contracts, containing forced arbitration provisions stating that
1 Noam

Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in
Walkout, N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-walkoutlabor.html (reporting how tech workers have surprised everyone by organizing
for their collective rights, shattering their stereotype of individualism).
2 See generallyMengqi Sun & Ezequiel Minaya, Google Workers' Walkout
Signals Crisis ofFaith in Company Culture, Recent Employee Activism is in
Response to Article that Detailed Company's Protectionof Three Executives
Accused of Sexual Misconduct, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/employee-discontent-threatens-googlesreputation- 154115 100 1.
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employees cannot bring sexual harassment, discrimination, and other
claims under federal and state laws against tech companies in court. In
other words, tech workers have pre-assigned and pre-settled their rights.
Moreover, the clauses require the employees to keep silent, as the proceeding and results are secret and often accompanied by non-disclosure
agreements.
The conventional path to void adhesion contracts under modem
contract law has been futile. Arguments that mandatory arbitration provisions should be severed under the doctrine of unconscionability have
proven ineffective, wasteful, and costly. Thus, the #MeToo tech visionaries have leveraged their inventive minds to chart a new path to disrupt
adhesion contracts and remove forced arbitration provisions from employment contracts, reclaiming their substantive rights and their access
to justice in public courts.3
This Article focuses on the #MeToo tech innovators' new disruption of adhesion contracts. This article posits that the tech women who
are #MeToo innovators have adopted a more effective means of destroying adhesion contracts than the traditionally ineffective unconscionability argument. These women's success in demanding and receiving the
removal of arbitration provisions in employment agreements through
collective organizing is a significant milestone that neither legislation
nor judicial efforts could provide to protect tech workers.
Part I traces the origin of adhesion contracts. Part II explores the
take-it-or-leave-it employment contracts containing mandatory arbitration provisions. Part III dissects the tech culture where employers have
enabled sexual misconduct. Part IV identifies and documents the #MeToo innovators' disruption movement, illustrating how these women use
survey evidence, share personal narratives, utilize technology, and leverage their talents to establish real change. Finally, Part V provides an
analysis of how the #MeToo innovators have disrupted adhesion contracts with arbitration provisions where conventional unconscionability
arguments have proven ineffective.
The Article concludes with a prediction that the #MeToo innovators' disruption will serve as a new contract lore where contract people-judges, lawyers and scholars alike-who have believed in unconscionability as the primary judicial tool for policing contracts, will
recognize that, in reality, the best modem tool for disruption is the collective organizing efforts of tech workers.4

' See generally Alex Moris, When Google Walked Rage Drove the Protests
Last Year, But Can It BringAbout Lasting Change at Tech Companies?,
N.Y.MAG (Feb. 5, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/can-thegoogle-walkout-bring-about-change-at-tech-companies.html (documenting the
#MeToo innovators' workers movement in the tech industiy).
' This new contract law follows examples of contact lore identified and
explained by Robert A. Hillman, ContractLore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 505-07
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I. THE ORIGIN OF ADHESION CONTRACTS
Adhesion contracts are firmly rooted in American contract law and
business practice. Adhesion contracts are typical standardized form contracts provided by a party with superior bargaining power to the weaker
party or adherent as a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition.5 These contracts6

leave employees no opportunity to negotiate their contractual terms.

Moreover, adhesion contracts in a consumer context do not provide the

weaker party with any overt manifestation of assent. This practice allows
contract formation to occur without the weaker party's awareness of ei7
ther the terms or the existence of the contract itself

Adhesion contracts are everywhere, from common carrier tickets, 8
Uber rideshares, 9 LimeBike,' 0 computer software," to website Terms of
(2002) (outlining three examples of contract lore in which contract people have
held on to "taditional beliefs" that have no support in reality).
' Keena v. Groupon, Inc. 192 F. Supp. 3d 630, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2016); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH

ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS

607-08 (9th

ed. 2019) (Although adhesion contacts, "or take-it-or-leave-it contracts, have
become the norm... the disparity in bargaining power that results from these
contacts is not considered sufficient to render them unconscionable.").
6 Brownv. Soh. 909 A.2d 43, 49 (Conn. 2006) ("The most salient feature
of
adhesion contracts is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts," and they tend to involve "standard form contacts prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a
consumer, who has little choice about the terms ....) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782-83 (Wash. 2005) (establishing factors to determine whether an adhesion contact exists: "(1) whether the contact is a standard form printed contact, (2) whether it was 'prepared
by one party and submitted to the other on a "take it or leave it" basis, and (3)
whether there was 'no true equality of bargaining power' between the parties.").
7 Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 266 (Ill. 2006) (stating that
in a contract of adhesion, "the tens... are nonnegotiable and presented in fine
print in language that the average consumer might not fully understand"); see
also Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of
Sticky Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REv. 129, 140-42 (2012); Cheryl B.
Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the
Horse, 26 BYUJ. PUB. L. 1, 22 (2011).
8 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991)
("Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a forn contract the
terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing
the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.")
9Dam Kerr, How Risky isyour Uber Ride? Maybe More Than You Think,
CNET (Oct. 8, 2014, 4:00 AM), https://www.cnet.comlnews/how-risky-is-youruber-ride-maybe-more-than-you-think/.
10 See generally David Gutman, Did You Read the Fine Print? We Did.
These Are the Rights You Give Up by Renting a LimeBike or Ofo, SEATTLE
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Use or Terms of Service. 12 In fact, these contracts govern modem daily
commerce. 3 Undeniably, adhesion contracts provide benefits such as
convenience, efficiency and cost reduction.' 4 Parties who are repeat
players and possess greater power in contractual relationships highly
favor adhesion contracts.' 5 Some scholars believe that adhesion contracts
generate cost savings that even benefit consumers. 16 It is no surprise,
then, that "standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts."' 7
Epistemologically, adhesion contracts have a rich history. The
phrase "adhesion contract" is not of American, but French origin. The
French jurist Raymond Saleilles coined the phrase in 1901.18 The Amenican scholar Edwin Paterson imported the phrase to the United States in

(updated Aug. 14, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://www.seattletimes.comlseattlenews/transportation/bike -share -user-agreements-the-rights-you-give-up-byrenting-a-limebike-or-ofo/.
" See generally Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.
1997) (upholding mass contracts used in sales of computers wherein the purchasers had paid for the computer without seeing the terms of the contract);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
one-sided mass contacts in sales of computer software).
12 See Davis v. USA Nutra Labs, 303 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1196 (D.N.M.
2018) (enforcing Groupon's terms of use, an example of adhesion contact);
Plazza v. Airbnb, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 537, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (considering Airbnb's terms of service as a "standard adhesion contact").
13 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (noting that mass contracts where pay-firstterms-later are "common for air transportation, insumnce, and many other endeavors"); Williams v. TCF Nat'l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 WL 708123, at
*9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013) ( "[C]ontracts of adhesion are a fact of modem life
and the lack of negotiation over the arbitration provision does not, standing
alone, establish procedural unconscionability.").
14 Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 743, 747
(2002) (" [B]ecause of the efficiencies and benefits of standard forms, it is not a
reach to predict that the economy would come to a screeching halt without
them.")
15 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion
Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract,43 COLuM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943).
16 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 ("Customers as a group are better off when
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use
instead a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such
documents, read or unread."); see generally Hillman, supra note 14 at 747 (noting the benefits of adhesion contracts).
17 See W. David Slawson StandardForm Contracts and Democratice Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 529 (1971).
18 Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law ofAdhesion Contracts:A JudicialResponse to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 1035,
1035 n. 1 (2010) (citing Raymond Saleilles, De la Ddclaration de Volont, art.
133, §89, at 229 (1901)).
TIMES
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his law review article published in 1919.19 Since then, adhesion contracts
have attracted many scholars' attention. This attention was so prominent
that some scholars have even constructed an intellectual history of adhesion contracts in the United States.20 Additionally, scholars have posited
that adhesion contracts "mirror the feudal system" that threaten "fundazl
mental principles of contract law."'
There exists a love-hate relationship with adhesion contracts in modernity. z Many academics share a grave concern about the inequality of
bargaining power that adhesion contracts present 2 3 Professor Charles L.
Knapp, an eminent contract law scholar, has lamented, "[I]t is impossible to tell whether the judges are truly as naive as they profess to be
about the realities of bargaining in the real world, or whether they just
don't care. '"24 Other scholars have joined the chorus, observing that
courts have failed to rein in the dangers adhesion contracts pose.2 5 Overall, many academics fear that the persistent use of adhesion contracts
undermines contract law through the privatization of contract
terms, in26
rights.
their
waiving
employees
and
courts
to
access
cluding
19 Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv.
L. REv. 198, 222 (1919); Edwin W. Patterson The Interpretationand Construction of Contracts,64 COLuM. L. REv. 833, 856-57 (1964).
20 See generally Preston and McCann, supra note 7 at 172-75.
21 See id.; Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontieror FeudalSociety: Metaphors

and Perceptionsof Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1207 (2002) (discussing scholars evoking feudal society in critiquing the digital era).
22 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Is the License Still the Product?, 60
ARIz. L. REV. 425, 427 (2017) ("Software developers may love licenses, but
many people love to hate licenses, especially end-user-license agreements (EULAs)" due to adhesive characteristics.); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629, 640
(1943) (stating that contracts of adhesion "enable [firms] ...to legislate in a
substantially authoritarian manner"); Todd D. Rakoff, ContractsofAdhesion:
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1229 (1983) ("The use of
form documents, if legally enforceable, imparts to firms... a freedom from
legal restraint and an ability to control relationships across a market.").
23 Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of BargainingPower, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139, 144 (2005) (observing that inequality of bargaining power issues "can
be observed in the contexts of contract defenses, contract formation, contract
interpretation, and contract remedies.").
24 Charles L. Knapp, Taking ContractsPrivate: The QuietRevolution in
ContractLaw, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 798 n.64 (2002).
25 Preston and McCann, supra note 7, at 130 (stating that courts have not
been able to keep adhesion contracts' dangers in check).
26 Knapp, supra note 24, at 798 (upon detailing concerns about adhesion
contracts, concluding by asking and answering, "Can powerful private interests,
with the ability to control most of the terms of most of the contracts they make,
deprive large segments of American society of their access to the courts for
which all of us pay, and to which all of us have historically had access? The
answer, until now, is-sadly, to some of us-that apparently they can."). See
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II. TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Some courts have defined adhesion contracts as standardized
agreements prepared by the superior party-generally the employerwhere the weaker party is denied the opportunity to negotiate terms, and
often is not given any explanation of the tems. 2 7 Other courts believe
otherwise. For example, Virginia courts have declined to find adhesion
contracts where employees are not required to work for employers. 28
Due to the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the adhesion contract, the "economic pressure exerted by employers on all, but the most sought-after
employees may be particularly acute." 29 As the employer imposes mandatory arbitration provision in the adhesion employment contract, "few
employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement."30

also Inna S. Russell, Got Wheels? Article 2A, StandardizedRental Car Terms,
Rational Inaction, and UnilateralPrivate Ordering,40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 137
(2006); Carol Van Sambeek, The Four CornersApproach to Judging the Enforceability ofArbitrationAgreements, Which Waive Statutory Rights to Litigate Employment DiscriminationClaims, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 247, 255 (2006).
27 Larsen v. Western States Ins. Agency, Inc., 170 P.3d 956, 959 (Mont.
2007); Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 146 A.3d 162, 169 (NJ. App. Div.
2016) ("When an employee has little to no bargaining power and a contract is
presented on "a take-it-or-leave-it" basis, the contract is one of adhesion."); Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996) (defining an adhesion
contact as "a standardized form offered on what amounts to a 'take it or leave
it' basis, without affording the weaker party a realistic opportunity to bargain,
and under conditions whereby the weaker party can only obtain the desired
product or service by submitting to the form of the contract").
28 See e.g., Schwam v. XO Communs., Inc., No. 05-1060, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7428, at *5-6 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2006) (citing Philyaw v. Platinum Enters., 54 Va. Cir. 364 (Va. Cir. 2001)); Greenv. Zachry Indus., Inc., 36 F. Supp.
3d 669, 677 (W.D. Va. 2014) (finding that because the plaintiff "had the freedom to consider employment elsewhere," the employment agreement with arbitration provision "is not an unenforceable contract of adhesion."); Zalit v. Global Linguist Solutions, 53 F. Supp. 3d 835, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 2014) ("Simply
because an employer and an employee do not stand on equal footing with respect to bargaining power does not magically transform an employment agreement into an adhesion contact."); Senture v. Dietrich, 575 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727
n.1 (E.D. Va. 2008) ("If an employee has the freedom to consider employment
elsewhere and is not bound to continue working for his current employer, an
employment agreement will not be considered an adhesion contract.").
29 Fitz v. NCR Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 702, 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see
also Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1996). Compare Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) ("Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.").
30 Fitz, 118 Cal. App. at 722.

Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law

[Vol. 26:3

For the past forty years, employers across the United States have
routinely inserted mandatory arbitration provisions in employment
agreements. Studies indicate that in both public and private companies,
more than "half-53.9 percent-of nonunion private-sector employers
have mandatory arbitration procedures. Among companies with 1,000 or
more employees, 65.1 percent have mandatory arbitration procedures."'"
In other words, about sixty million Americans are bound by employment
contracts with arbitration clauses. 3 2 Also, a recent study of approximately 800,000 contracts formed by public companies and attached to documents filed with the Security Exchange Commission, reveals that employment agreements with arbitration clauses constitutes the largest
percentage.33 Specifically, out of 140,980 employment agreements, 42%
contain confidential, mandatory arbitration provisions .34 In contrast, out
of 167,523 credit agreements, only 0.04% contain arbitration provisions.35
Courts have long supported the inclusion of arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. For example, in 1974, the New York Supreme
court in Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., Inc. held that an
arbitration provision in an employment contract was enforceable when
both parties were obligated to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the
agreement.3 6 The Court upheld the provision even though the employer
had the sole discretion to arbitrate or bring an action against the employ37
ee in disputes involving a violation of a restrictive covenant.
In more recent decades, the use of arbitration has shifted claims
from public courts to private proceedings. This change received a strong
31ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL'Y INST. THE GROWING USE OF

10 (2006), https://www.epi.org/publication/thegrowing-use-of-mandatoiy-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-formore -than-60-million-american-workers/.
32 Id.; see also Jaclyn Diaz, More Employers Turn to Arbitration to Handle
Job Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 6, 2018, 3:16 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/more-employers-tum-toarbitration-to-handle-job-claims.
33 Samth Sanga, A New Strategyfor RegulatingArbitration, 113 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1121, 1151 (2019).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Riccardi v. Modem Silver Linen Supply Co., Inc., 356 N.Y.S.2d 872
(N.Y. 1974).
37 Id.; see also Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 538 N.Y. S.2d 513, 517
(1989) (explaining that the Riccardi court "decided the case on narrower
grounds, emphasizing that the parties exchanged binding promises to submit all
disputes to arbitration except those relating to breach of the restrictive covenant
provision, and held that it was penissible for the parties to carve out an area of
potential controversy from an otherwise mutually binding arbitration agreement
and give one party the unilateral right to select the dispute resolution forum in
that area").
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
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endorsement from the U.S. Supreme Court. Employers have become
emboldened to impose mandatory arbitration on all employee claims,
including civil rights and discrimination claims.38 The Court's enthusiasm for arbitration originated in a decision in 1983.39 Later, the Supreme
Court in 1991 approved arbitration of age-discrimination claims in
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.40 The Court held that neither
the text nor the legislative history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act removes age-discrimination claims from arbitration. 41 A
decade later, the Supreme Court upheld the arbitrability of Title VII
claims in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.42 In that case, the employee
faced on-the-job harassment and retaliation based upon his sexual orientation.
He brought an action in state court for discrimination under a civil
rights statute. 43 The employment contract at issue extended arbitration to
all claims under federal and state statutes, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.44 The Supreme Court praised the benefits of arbitration,
claiming that "arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law., 45 Later, the Supreme Court upheld an employer's ability to
force mandatory arbitration of race discrimination claims, 46 as well as
another age discrimination case.47 Lower courts followed the Supreme
Court's lead and approved arbitration clauses in other employment discrimination claims. 48
38 See e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018)
(holding that mandatoiy agreements requiring parties to resolve employmentrelated disputes through one-on-one arbitration do not violate the National Labor Relations Act).
39 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.").
40 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
41 Id.
42 Cicuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
43 Brief for Respondent at 1, Cicuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1369473, at *1.
44 Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 110.
45 Id. at 123.
46 Rent-A-Center, W, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72-76 (2010).
47 See also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
48 Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 Fed. Appx
482, 483 (6th Cir. 2008) (forcing arbitration of pregnancy-discrimination); Am.
Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 2005) (compelling arbitration in a sex discrimination case); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of
Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding arbitration of
religious-discrimination claims).
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Alarmed by the Court's direction, scholars have expressed concerns
49
about the inclusion of mandatory arbitration in employment contracts.
They have documented how the take-it-or-leave-it adhesive characteristics of employment agreements force employees to arbitrate all claims,
prospectively waiving their substantive rights.5 ° Lacking real bargaining
power, employees essentially pre-sell and pre-settle their claims by
agreeing to arbitrate their claims without access to judicial protection.5
These concerns, unfortunately, are no longer purely academic, but
comprise the harsh reality faced by employees today. In Cooper v. MRM
Investment Co., Tonya Cooper alleged that she was sexually harassed
and discharged as an assistant manager of a KFC franchise.5 2 She earned
$400 to $450 per week plus possible bonuses. 53 She signed the "Arbitration of Employee Rights," which required her to use "confidential binding arbitration" for any claims arising between her and KFC, its related
entities, and their current or former employees. 54 The terms included any
claims concerning compensation, sexual harassment, and termination of
employment, among others.55 After she complained to management
about the alleged sexual harassment, KFC fired her. By signing the employment contract with the arbitration agreement, she had waived her
Title VII employment discrimination claims in federal court.56 Likewise,
A search in Westlaw with adhesion contract and employment as search
terms appearing in the same sentence yields 242 results. Due to the space constraint, I will provide a few here. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on
49

MandatoryArbitration: Unconscionabilityas a SignalingDevice, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009); Jean R. Stemlight, DisarmingEmployees: How
American Employers Are Using MandatoryArbitration to Deprive Workers of
Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REv. 1309, 1317-22 (2015).
50 David S. Schwartz, EnforcingSmall Pricingto ProtectBig Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in the Age of CompelledArbitration,1

WIs. L. REv. 33, 116 (1997) (warning about the hanns of standardization of
mandatory arbitration in employment contacts).
51 Id. at 114-16 (explaining the nature and scope of the prospective waivers
of substantive rights); see also Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives,
Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver ofADEA Rights: The Failureof the Older Workers'Benefit ProtectionAct, 79 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1296-97 (1993) ("The

employer who has purchased the right to discriminate is surely more likely to
indulge discriminatory preferences .... An employee who waives her rights to
be free of discrimination at the outset of employment may be blinded by her
need for a job and the immediate prospect of a higher salary."); Judith A.
McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling PrivateRights ofAction,

34 VILL. L. REv. 429, 464 (1989).
52 Cooper v. IRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004).
13 Id. at 497.
54
Id. at 497-98.
55 Id.
56

2002).

See Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 779-80 (M.D. Tenn.
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her right to have a jury of her peers evaluate her claim also vanished."
Similarly, in American GeneralLife and Accident Insurance Co. v.
Wood, Larry P. Wood commenced an action in West Virginia state court
against his employer, asserting state law claims of sex discrimination
and wage law violations.58 Because he had signed an arbitration agreement, Wood had forfeited his right to sue under antidiscrimination law in
state proceedings. 59 Moreover, his "relinquishment of state-created constitutional rights to state judicial forums and trial by jury did not render"
the arbitration agreement unenforceable.60
In recent years, even when the employees have never signed the arbitration agreement, an employer can still compel an employee to arbitrate rather than litigate their claims. For instance, in Seawright v. American General Financial Services, Lisa Seawright worked for her
employer for twenty-seven years, from 1978 to 2005.61 She alleged that
her employer terminated her in violation of Tennessee antidiscrimination
law and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. 62 The company insisted that she must arbitrate her claims per their Agreement, introduced
by the employer more than twenty years after her employment began,
even though she had never consented to the arbitration. 63 Indeed, it was
not until April 1999 that the company notified its employees, via a series
of announcements and informational meetings, about its then-new employee dispute resolution program. 64 The company's informational brochure stated that all disputes, including disputes for "legally protected
'
rights such as freedom from discrimination, retaliation, or harassment, "65
were to be conducted through binding arbitration.66 The brochure also
indicated that employees "seeking, accepting, or continuing employment" with the company automatically agreed to resolve all claims
through binding arbitration.67 Thus, without assenting to the arbitration
agreement, Ms. Seawright was forced to arbitrate, forfeiting her substantive and constitutional rights.68
The constitutional right to a jury trial was once a cherished right re-

57Id. at 775, 779.
58

Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 85 (4th Cir.

2005).

59Id. at 86-87.

Id. at 88.
Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Serv. Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 970.
63
Id.at 970-71.
64 Id.
65Seawright, 507 F.3d at 971.
66 Id. The company sent a letter that reminded its employees about binding
60
61
62

arbitration two years after the program became effective.
67

Id.

68

Id. at 979-80 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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spected in employment contract cases. 69 Traditionally, the right could not
70
be waived unless the employees knowingly and voluntarily waived it.
The Supreme Court's declaration of a "national policy favoring arbitration, combined with the erosion of the "knowing and voluntarily waive"
standard, has culminated in a voluminous body of law favoring employers. 71
In addition to stripping employees of their constitutional rights to
jury trial and other substantive rights, the use of adhesion contracts with
arbitration provisions deprive states of the authority to protect their citizens. 7 2 The Supreme Court has assured states that they still have the authority to regulate contracts and protect their own citizens. The assurance, at best, is illusory.73 Worse, empirical evidence in a recent study
establishes that the Supreme Court's assurance has been false, as the
Court has foreclosed "nearly every plausible circumstance" under which
states "may regulate ... arbitration clauses" in contracts.74
In summary, the problems caused by adhesion employment contracts with mandatory provisions have culminated in a systemic crisis.
For employees, the inequality of power, waiver of substantive rights, and
elimination of the constitutional right to a jury trial are the daily reality
in the workplace across the nation. Meanwhile, states face an inability to
regulate contracts as they choose. Contracts now are products of privatization, buried deep the in secrecy of arbitration, aided by the Supreme
7
Court's "national policy favoring arbitration. '

69

Id. at 981 (stating that under Sixth Circuit precedent, "employees cannot

not be compelled to arbitrate their claims if they did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitutional right to a jury trial").
71 Id. (reviewing Sixth Circuit precedents on "knowing and voluntary
standard for agreements to arbitrate in lieu of litigation").
71 See Sanga, supra note 33, at 1128-35 (analyzing the Supreme Court's
"national policy favoring arbitration"). Professor Sanga traced the origin of the
Supreme Court's national policy favoring arbitration to Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1984).
72 See Sanga, supra note 33, at 1128-29 (demonstrating how states have
lost control over contract enforcement).
73Id. at 1128.
71Id. at 1129.
75See Natalie Hrubos, Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims: Pyett illustratesNeed to Re-Forestthe Legal Landscape, 18
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 281 (2008); Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts
Create Moral Hazard?: When JudgesNullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN.L. REV. 998 (2009).
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III. TECH EMPLOYERS AS ENABLERS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCTS
Women across industries struggle to report sexual harassment in the
workplace.76 The tech sector in particular fosters a culture that cherishes
bold ideas, prizes high performers, and protects tech evangelists. Unfortunately, it enables sexual harassment and misconduct in tech camps,
conferences and venture capital meetings, and during job interviews and
in office settings.
A.

What Women in Tech Face

The tech culture is rooted in welcoming new ideas, breaking down
barriers, and encouraging creative collaboration.77 The same tech culture
also enables sexual harassment and misconduct. 78 At the annual Foo
Camp, an "unconference" annual tech event, 79 attendees "bounce around
the space and ideas and conversations, and so many of the normal social
distances break down into collaboration," while at the same time female
attendees frequently face sexually explicit questions from creators of
tech companies during their presentations.80 During the evening, the Foo
76 Claire Cain Miller, It 's Not Just Fox: Why Women Don'tReport Sexual
Harassment,N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/upshot/its-not-just-fox-why-women-dontreport-sexualharassment.html?action click&module=RelatedCovemge&pgtype=Article&region=F
ooter.
77See Nick Bastone, The 29 Tech Companies With the Best Company Culture in 2018, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/best-company-culture-2018-full-list-2018-12.
78 See generally Katie Benner, Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of
Harassment,N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speakout-sexual-hamssment.html; Sara O'Brien & Laurie Segall, Sexual Harassment
in Tech: Women Tell Their Stories, CNN TECH,
https://money.cnn.com/technology/sexual-hamssment-tech/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2019); John Pletz, 1 in 4 Women Report Harassmentat Tech Conferences:

Study, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Mar. 12, 2019, 2:04 PM),

https://www.chicagobusiness.com/j ohn-pletz-technology/1-4-women-reportharassment-tech-conferences-study.
79See Foo Camp, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FooCamp
(last visited Nov. 28, 2019), for more information on Foo Camp.
80 Caitlin Mullen, Where Tech Conferences Get ft Wrong for Women,
BIZJOURNALS, https://www.bizjoumals.com/bizwomen/news/latestnews/2019/03/where-tech-conferences-get-it-wrong-for-women.html?page=all
("From sexist comments to robot strippers, tech conferences-and the industry
itself-often have an atmosphere that doesn't exactly convey gender equality in
the field."). Quinn Norton, Robert Scoble and Me, MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://medium.com/@O)quinnnorton/robert-scoble-and-me-9b l4ee92fffb. Additonally, female attendees face sexual harassment and assaults at tech camps and
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Camp unconference shifts to a casual vibe for different activities, as recalled by attendees. 8 The drinking, and the pressure to drink, has reportedly led to male attendees continuing to pour drinks for drunk female
attendees, creating an uncomfortable environment.8 2 Also at Foo Camp
and Startup Riot, powerful technology evangelist Robert Scoble openly
sexually assaulted female attendees by putting his hands on their breasts
and bottoms when others introduced him to them in public spaces.83
From Foo Camp to Startup Riot to Dent Conference, predators roamed
and assaulted women in tech even after the women had reported the misconduct to the organizers.84

conferences. Davey Alba, A Multimillion-DollarStartup HidA Sexual Harassment Incident By Its CEO Then A Community of OutsidersDraggedIt Into the
Light, BuZZFEED NEWS (May 13, 2019, 9:30 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/datacamp-sexual-hamssmentmetoo-tech-startup ("One evening that week at an after-hours bar with a live
band playing, DataCamp CEO Jonathan Comelissen groped 27-year-old Karm
Woo, a DataCamp curriculum lead. According to Woo, as other DataCamp employees milled about, a drunken Comelissen pressed his crotch into Woo's behind, fondling her hips and thighs."); Gaby Del Valle, A We Work employee says
she wasfired after reportingsexual assault. The company says her claims are
meritless.A new lawsuit claims the company spent more on partiesthan on sexual harassmenttraining,VOX (updated Oct. 12, 2018, 6:05 PM),
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/12/17969190/wework-lawsuit-sexualassault-harassment-retaliation ("The complaint, which was filed on Thursday in
the Manhattan Supreme Court, details former employee Ruby Anaya's allegations against the company. Anaya, who began working at WeWolk in 2014,
says she was groped by two different employees at two company-wide events
where attendance was mandatory and alcohol was readily available ....The
first alleged incident occurred in August 2017 at an annual company event
called Summer Camp; on Facebook, the company described Summer Camp as a
"festival-esque getaway" for employees and their guests. Anaya claims that a
male co-worker "grabbed [her] from behind in a sexual manner," and that when
that employee was questioned by human resources, he said he didn't remember
the event because he was "black-out drunk."); O'Brien & Segall, supra note 78
(reporting that at a tech conference in 2014, Pavel Curda propositioned to
Gesche Haas with an email that read, "I will not leave Berlin without having sex
with you. Deal?").
81Id.
82

Id.

Id.; see also Doree Shafrir,Another Woman Has Accused Robert Scoble
of Sexual Harassment,BuzzFEED (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:56 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/doree/woman-accuses-robert-scoble-ofsexual-harassment#.blJWzWxjX (reporting that Scoble groped Greer at the
Startup Riot tech conference in Atlanta).
84 Alyssa Newcomb, #MeToo: Sexual HarassmentRallying Cry Hits Silicon Valley, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/technews/metoo-sexual-hamssment-mllying-ciy-hits-silicon-valley-n813271 ("Sarah Kunst, founder of Proday Media, tweeted she had reported Scoble's bad
83
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Meanwhile, the same behavior goes on in the ordinary workplace.
Susan Fowler, a former engineer at Uber, recounts experiencing a culture
of sexual harassment daily."' Beginning on her first official day on the
Site Reliability Engineer team, the team manager asked her to have sex
with him in a string of messages over the company's chat platform. 86 She
immediately took screenshots and reported him to Human Resources
(HR).8 7 HR and upper management at Uber informed her that because it
was the first time the manager had committed sexual harassment and he
was a "high performer" at the Company, they would not take any action
beyond talking to him.88 HR also ordered that Fowler make a choice of
either transferring to a different team or staying with the same team and
receiving a negative review from the manager.89 HR explained to Fowler
that the negative review would not be viewed as retaliation because she
was given an option to transfer. 90 Fowler subsequently transferred to a
different team. During her one-year tenure at Uber, Fowler also documented other sexist emails and chat records and sent them to HR. Instead
of working to fix the problems, the HR representative accused Fowler of
initiating the incidents, and blamed her for saving the emails and chat
records. 91 Her new manager then threatened to fire her if she reported
him to HR.92 Fowler reported the threat to HR and the Chief Technology
Officer. Though they admitted to her that the threat was illegal, because
the manager was a "high performer," they once again did nothing. 93
Fowler soon learned that other female engineers at Uber had similar
experiences. 94 They, too, had reported to HR to no avail. 95 Together,
Fowler and the female engineers requested a meeting with HR about the

behavior to organizers of the Dent Conference, yet he still continued to attend.").
85 Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber,
SUSAN FOWLER BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017),
https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-very-strangeyear-at-uber.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. ("Upper management told me that he 'was a high performer' (i.e. had

stellar performance reviews from his superiors) and they wouldn't feel comfortable punishing him for what was probably just an innocent mistake on his
part.").
89 Id.
90 Id.

91 Id. ("The HR rep began the meeting by asking me if I had noticed that
*1*was the common theme in all of the reports I had been making, and that if I
had ever considered that I might be the problem.").
92

Id.

93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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manager's sexual harassment, but the HR representative insisted that the
manager "had never been reported before. 96 Later, around the same
time the women left Uber, the company's female workforce dropped
from 25% women to less than 6%.97
Sexual harassment and misconduct are an "open secret" in the tech
industry. 98 The pervasiveness of the open secret occurs beyond the
campfires, conferences, unconferences, and team projects. Harassment
even occurred during these women's interviews for their jobs at tech
companies. For example, Dan McClure, the co-founder and former CEO
of startup accelerator 500 Startups, told a potential female hire, "I was
getting confused figuring out whether to hire you or hit on you." 99
Very few women dare to speak out about this harassment for fear of
destroying both their careers and personal lives.' 00 For example, entrepreneur Cheryl Yeoh did not speak out after Dan McClure pushed himself on her in a comer because she "had to preserve" her business relationship with him in order for a contract to be signed that same week.' 0 '
The few female founders in the industry have received lurid texts, groping, and unwanted sexual propositions. For example, founders Niniane
Wang, Susan Ho, and Leiti Hsu all described their dealings with Binary

96

Id.

97 Id.

Newcomb, supra note 84 ("Much like Hollywood and the Harvey Weinstein story, a culture of sexual harassment and misconduct being perpetated by
some of the most powerful men in Silicon Valley had long been whispered
about. The technology industry's shameful open secret was publicly aired earlier this year when female founders began coming forward to share stories of
male investors crossing the line ....).
99Alyssa Newcomb, Silicon Valley Grapples With How to Fix a Sexist Culture, NBC NEWS (July 26, 2017, 3:15 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/silicon-valley-grapples-how-fixsexist-culture-n 7 7 6906.
100 See, e.g., Erika Beas, Poll: Nearly Halfof the Women Who Experienced
Sexual HarassmentLeave TheirsJobs or Switch Careers,MARKETPLACE, (Mar.
9,
2018),
https://www.marketplace.org/2018/03/09/new-numbers-reflectlasting-effects-workplace-hamssment-women/;
Newcomb, supra note 99;
98

ELYSE SHAW ET. AL., INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y RES., SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND

ASSAULT AT WORK:

UNDERSTANDING

THE

COSTS

(Oct.

15,

2018),

https://iwpr.org/publications/sexual-harassment-work-cost/ ("Sexual harassment
and assault at work have serious implications for women and for their employers. Women who are targets may experience a mnge of negative consequences,
including physical and mental health problems, career intermptions, and lower
earnings.").
101 Cheryl Y. Sew Hoy, Shedding Light on the "Black Box of Inappropriateness," CHERYL: BREADCRUMBS: A SERIES OF CONNECTED EvENTS (July 3,
2017), https://cherylyeoh.com/2017/07/03/shedding-light-on-the-black-box-ofinappropriateness/.
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Capital's Justin Caldbeck. 1 2 Wielding their economic prowess, venture
capitalists have attempted to use their companies' funding to silence the
female founders. 103
Often, the women suffer. Their work performance may suffer due to
the harassment, and they are often fired if they report sexual misconduct.104 Some women had no place to turn. In one extreme case, a woman committed suicide because after she informed her husband and
friends, she was ostracized by her tech peers and received hate mail and
endless accusations. 105
B. What PredatorsReceive
Tech companies go after talent. That often means male talent. That
translates into rewarding male tech workers who are deemed as "high
performers" with a slap on the wrist when women report sexual harassment. 10 6 Tech companies protect high-performing men by driving wom102

Sarah Lacy, Binary Capital'sJustin CalbeckAccused of Unwanted Sex-

ual Advances Towards Female Founders. Where's the Outrage?, PANDO (June
22, 2017), https://pando.com/2017/06/22/binaiy-capitals-justin-caldbeckaccused-unwanted-sexual-advances-towards-female-founders-wheres-outrage/.
See also Laura Sydell, How a Female EngineerBuilt a Public Case Against a
Sexual Harasserin Silicon Valley, NPR (Dec. 13, 2017, 1:17 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/12/13/568455103/how-awoman-engineer-built-a-public-case-against-a-sexual-harasser-in-silicon-va.
103 See Benner, supra note 78; Sarah Lacy, Founder:Days Before Scandal
Broke, Binary'sJustice Caldbeck "Tried to Use Funding to Shut Me Up,"
PANDO (June 24, 2017), https://pando.com/2017/06/24/niniane-wang-daysscandal-broke-binarys-justin-caldbeck-tried-use-funding-shut-me/.
104 Debra S. Katz, 30 Million Women Can't Sue Their Employer Over Harassment. Hopefully That's Changing,WASH. POST (May 17, 2018, 4:55 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/companies-are-finally-lettingwomen-take-sexual-harassment-to-court/2018/05/17/552ca876-594e- 1le8b656-a5f8c2a9295d stoiy. html?norediiect=on&utm term=.896e57d13a2a
(" [A]s many as 75 percent, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission-report suffering retaliation along with the initial abuse."); Shaffir, supra note 82 (reporting what happened to Michele Greer after she reported
sexual harassment).
105 Norton, supra note 80 ("But after one fateful party, she told her new
husband that she was sexually assaulted. He threw her assaulter off a mailing
list we were all on, and then quit as the list administrator. It blew up into a local
scandal, and people demanded to know who the victim was. We tried to hide
her identity, but her name got posted to the list. Once she was outed as a victim,
the hate mail, the barrage of nasty questions, the endless accusations took, such
a toll on her. Eventually, she took her own life. She'd just never been able to put
it all back together after that.").
106 Fowler, supra note 85; see also Marianne Cooper, The 3 Things That
Make OrganizationsMore Prone to Sexual Harassment,THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/organizationssexual-harassmentl546707/ (reporting that Amazon's CEO Jeff Bezos' silence
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en out of the workplace. They do this by refusing to grant transfers, giving them negative reviews, and threatening to fire them. 10 7 But forcing
women out of the industry is not the only way that the tech companies
protect perpetrators of sexual misconduct.
Tech companies have also paid powerful predators attractive exit
packages. A study by Blind reported that 33.05% of respondents in the
survey stated that their companies have paid "high dollar exit packages"
to employees accused of sexual misconduct.'0 8 These companies include
Google, Intel, Booking.com, Uber, Microsoft, Cisco, Overall, Oracle,
Amazon, Apple, Linkedln, and Facebook.' 0 9 For example, Google paid
Android founder Andy Rubin almost $100 million amid employees accusing Rubin of sexual harassment." 0 Google also paid $15 million to
Amit Singhal, who was accused of sexual harassment."'
There is yet another way the tech sector has been enabling sexual
misconduct: the tech culture fails to punish powerful male employees or
employers who have sexually harassed women, even encouraging rivals
to hire them or prompting investors to fund them. For example, Google
paid Amit Singhal to leave the company, but Uber immediately hired
him, allowing him to collect $15 million from Google and enjoy new
power at Uber." 2 Eyal Gutentag, Uber's LA general manager, left the

after Roy Price, head of Amazon Studios resigned amid sexual harassment allegations, "continues a pattern of inaction by the company").
107 Fowler, supra note 85.
108 Kyle McCarthy, 113 of Tech Employees: My Company Has Given Generous Exit Packages To Employees Accused of Sexual Misconduct, BLIND (Nov.
13, 2018), https://www.teamblind.comlblog/index.php/2018/11/13/one-third-oftech-employees-my-company-has-given-generous-exit-packages-to-employeesaccused-of-sexual-misconduct.
109 Id.

110 Nate Swanner, Sexual HarassmentPayouts in Tech: Here are the Worst
Offenders, DICE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://insights.dice.com/2018/11/15/sexualharassment-payouts-tech-companies/; see also Jillian D'Onfro, Google 'sApproval Of $135 Million Payout To Execs Accused Of Sexual Misconduct Sparks
Fresh Employee Backlash, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/03/12/googles-approval-of135-million-payout-to-execs-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-sparks-fre shemployee-backlash/#6dealOe23cf3.
111 Shannon Liao, Google Confirms It Agreed to Pay $135 Million to Two
Execs Accused of Sexual Harassment,THE VERGE (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/11/18260712/google-amit-singhal-andymbin-payout-lawsuit-accused-sexual-harassment (reporting that Google first
offered to pay Amit Singhal $45 million but then reduced to $15 million because he joined Uber, a rival company).
112 Id. See also Gabrielle Canon, Google gave top executive $90m payoff
but kept sexual misconduct claim quiet, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2018,
6:42PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/25/google-andymbin-android-creator-payoff-sexual-misconduct-report (" E]xecutives had rela-
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company after multiple employees reported him for groping female subordinates." 3 Four months later, Gutentag had a new powerful position as
Chief Operations Officer at HopSkipDrive, a competitor of Uber.1 4 He
subsequently joined ZipRecruiter, a tech unicorn valued at more than a
billion dollars as Chief Marketing Officer." 5 Likewise, Mike Cagney,
the former CEO of Social Finance, left the company after a series of
people reported his sexual misconduct. He then founded a new startup
with fresh funding of $120 million." 6 Also, Steve Jurvetson left Draper
Fisher Jurvetson after the firm's internal investigation about his sexual
misconduct, and two months later, he then debuted Future Ventures with
117
$200 million in new funding.
In addition to large payouts and new jobs, the predators received
praise from their peers for their conduct. For instance, Dave McClure
received admiration from his peers after the women came forward to
report how he has sexually assaulted them:
"yeah, but you were always upfront about it. It was your
USP. Why is anyone surprised? ; )"
"Dave you're not a creep, you're a solid dude. I sorta
wish you didn't apologize for wanting a sex life like other
human beings."
"Dave, well done; continue. Listen, yr head went on a
pike, but yr. past behaviour is THE NORM, every industry & setting. Keep communicating."
"This took guts. Respect to Dave as well here a great example."
"Jesus F*cking Christ you are a MAN and hit on a woman. That is NORMAL behavior. Don't let people neuter
you publicly for being YOU!"
"You are only human! i wish u the best"

tionships and extramarital affairs with subordinate employees, including David
Drummond, Alphabet's chief legal officer," with Jennifer Blakely, who "was
then transferred to another department, before leaving a year later, having been
asked to sign paperwork saying she had departed voluntarily. Drummond's career, meanwhile, accelerated."); Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Amit
Singhal, UberExecutive Linked to Old HarassmentClaim, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/technology/uber-sexualharassment-amit-singhal-re sign. html.
113 See Ryan Mac & Davey Alba, These Tech Execs Faced#MeToo Allegations. They All Have New Jobs, BuZZFEED (Apr. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/tech-men-accused-sexualmisconduct-new-j obs-metoo.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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"Read your story of self-castration. Sorry you felt it necessary. They're still going to call you a monster forever.
Shouldn't have apologized"
"Unpin this immediately and delete that medium post.
You have nothing to be ashamed of. No counseling needed. You are a fPcking MAN OWN IT.""18
In sum, the tech culture has allowed abusers to engage in sexual harassment, assault, and misconduct for far too long without consequences.
Tech employers and investors refuse to punish the perpetrators-instead,
they enable, reward, and protect them.
IV. #METoo INNOVATORS, DISRUPTION CULTURE, AND REMOVAL OF
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN ADHESION CONTRACTS
Gretchen Carlson, a former Fox News host, describes the familiar
scenario that women who have signed contracts with forced arbitration
agreements face after they pursue sexual harassment claims in the workplace:
In the process, she'll probably be black-listed, demoted
and fired from her job. She may get a paltry settlement,
but our woman will probably work again. No one else at
her place of employment will know what happened to
her and, worst of all, the perpetrator gets to stay on the
job because nobody knows about it, the whole process is
secret. And that person is free to harass again and
again. 119

As mentioned above, about sixty million American workers are
barred from having access to the court system to adjudicate their employment claims because their employment contracts contain arbitration
provisions. 2 ° Women constitute 47% of the total workforce, meaning
millions of women cannot go to court if they experience sexual harassment in the workplace.' 2' Nor is what Carlson has described confined to
the news industry.
As innovators, the women and men in tech have engaged their own
internal social disruption moment: they are organizing and forcing man-

Sew Hoy, supra note 101.
Jacqueline Thomsen, Gretchen Carlson Urges Lawmakers to PassBill
EndingArbitrationfor Sexual HarassmentClaims, THE HILL (May 16, 2019,
11:35 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-the-know/444032gretchen-carlson-urges-lawmakers-to-pass-bill-ending-arbitration-for-sexual.
120COLVIN, supra note 31.
121 Richard Fry & Renee Sepler, Women May Never Make Up Halfof the
US. Workforce, PEW RESEARCH (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/31/women-may-never-makeup-half-of-the-u-s-workforce/; Katz, supra note 104.
118
119
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agement to remove mandatory arbitration provisions from the adhesion
contracts. In so doing, they are bypassing the conventional and ineffective route of appealing to courts to stay arbitration. They also discard the
unconscionability argument against adhesion contracts, as courts have
become either hostile or indifferent to the theory.
A. Social DisruptionMoment:
Survey Evidence and PersonalNarratives
The tech sector highly prizes ideas that disrupt traditional business
models. Stories about disturbances etch in the mind of entrepreneurs,
founders, and tech workers. Disruption in the tech industry means innovation: an underrated product or service becomes popular by replacing or
displacing a conventional product or service. 122 The key features of dis12
ruption that outplay competitors are low cost and high accessibility. 1
Tangible examples of disruption include Netflix streaming video, Wikipedia for constantly updated encyclopedias, and LEDs for efficient and
cheap light sources. 124 True disruption is a "gamble," is "stealthy," and
12
takes time. 1
Within the ethos of disruption innovation, the women and men in
tech have been orchestrating their approach to disrupt adhesion contracts
that include mandatory arbitration provisions. After witnessing the
#MeToo movement, during which millions of women and some men in a
wide range of industries have spoken out about their experiences, tech
innovators wanted to use their expertise and the tools that are familiar
and available to them. 126 But first, they needed data to understand the
scope of the problem.127 Thus, tech innovators turned to survey evidence.
For survey evidence, seven women in Silicon Valley with backgrounds in venture capital, academic, entrepreneurship, product marketing, and marketing research collaborated to conduct a survey of women
in tech.128 Together, they had 210 women complete an online survey in
122

"Dismptive innovation" was coined by Clayton Christensen. Peter Dai-

syme, What is Disruption,Really? 8 Examples and What to Learnfrom Them,
STARTUPGRIND,

https://www. startupgrind.com/blog/what-is-disruption-really-

8-examples-and-what-to-leam-from-them/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See generally Farhad Manjoo, Why the Google Walkout Was a Watershed Moment in Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/technology/google-walkout-watershedtech.html.
127 Newcomb, supra note 84 (reporting that as of October 2017, there were
more than 1.6 million #MeToo tweets about their experience with sexual harassment and misconduct in a variety of industries).
128 ELEPHANT IN THE VALLEY, https://www.elephantinthevalley.com/ (last
visited July 12, 2019).
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early 2015. The participants were tech veterans who had worked in the
sector for more than ten years. 129 They came from venture capital firms.
They are the CEO, CMO, and CTOs at tech companies. They are founders, entrepreneurs, and marketers in the tech sector. 3 ° The researchers
collected the results and posted their findings online.
The aptly named "Elephant in the Valley" survey divulges what
women have been experiencing in tech.' 3' The survey reveals that 60%
of women had received unwanted sexual advances, 65% of the harass13 2
ment came from their superiors, and 50% suffered it more than once.
More than 30% of the women who experienced sexual harassment were
afraid for their own personal safety in the workplace. Most of the women
did not dare to take action after they were sexually harassed. About 39%
of those who were harassed did not do anything for fear of harming their
careers, while another 30% did not report because they just wanted to
forget what happened to them. For the women who reported sexual harassment, 60% were dissatisfied with management action. The participants, 29% of them, reported that they signed non-disclosure agreements
as part of their employment contracts. 133 That means they must refrain
from speaking about their experiences and the treatment they received
from their employers.
To supplement the survey results, some women in tech were courageous enough to step forward, providing personal narratives of their experience.1 34 In so doing, they named the perpetrators and exposed sexual
misconduct. As described above, in 2017, Susan Fowler, Quinn Norton,
Sarah Kunst, Niniane Wang, Susan Ho, Leiti Hsu, Cheryl Yeoh, and
many others publicly recounted, described, and posted their experiences
on Medium, Twitter, and their own websites.
Id.
Id.
131 Id.
129
130

Newcomb, supra note 84.
supra note 128. Tech companies often use nondisparagement
clauses in employment contrcts to silence employees and hide abuses. See
132

133ELEPHANT,

Katie Benner, Abuses Hide in the Silence ofNondisparagementAgreements,

N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/2 1/technology/silicon-valley-sexualharassment-non-disparagementagreements.html?action click&module=RelatedCovemge&pgtype=Article&region =
Footer.
134 Some courageous female founders in tech spoke out while many understandingly were reluctant to publicly detail the sexual hamssments. See Laura
Sydell, Strugglingfor Investments, Silicon Valley Women Reluctant to Speak
out on Harassment,NPR (Nov. 16, 2017, 7:15 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/11/16/56449813 3/struggli

ng-for-inve stments-silicon-valley-women-reluctant-to-speak-out-on-hamss.
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In particular, founder Niniane Wang methodically built her case
against Justin Caldbeck, a potential investor in her startup who had pressured her for sex, in order to stop Caldbeck from harassing other women.' 35 She gathered evidence, including texts, emails, and phone records,
teamed up with two other women who had faced similar treatment from
Caldbeck, and together published their stories in a "dispassionate way
with evidence that describes the details of what happened without extraneous, irrelevant content."' 13 6 They selected The Information, a media
outlet frequented by the tech elite, to post their stories-all13 7so others
As true
might know what happened to women in the tech industry.
disruption is stealthy and takes time, after gathering survey evidence and
learning from personal narratives, the innovators next leveraged their
culture and tech tools for real change through collective organizing.
B. #MeToo, Innovators and Collective Organizingin Tech

Through speaking out, the women in tech learned that their employment contracts prohibited them from speaking disparagingly about
their employers and contained mandatory arbitration clauses. 138 They
could not sue their employers in any court of law.
The women in tech know that in employment contracts with arbitration provisions, employers increase their chances of winning when they
use arbitration to keep all claims and problems secret. 139 Illustratively, in
a study of 2,802 mandatory employment arbitration cases decided between 2003 and 2004, the employee's winning rate was only 17.9%
when an employer had only one case in arbitration. 140 That small winning rate, however, drops to 15.3% when the employer had four cases
and 4.5% when the employer had twenty-five cases before the same arbitrator.141
Armed with the evidence from various studies, the "Elephant in the
Valley" survey and personal narratives, the innovators in the tech sector
Sydell, supra note 102.
Id.
137 Id.
138 See Bloomberg Editorial Board, MandatoryArbitrationEnables Sexual
Harassment(Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019135
136

06-12/forced-arbitration-enables-sexual-harassment.
139 See Nick Wingfield & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, MicrosoftMoves to
End Secrecy in Sexual HarassmentClaims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sexual-harassmentarbitration.html ("The more often companies head to arbitration, the better their
chances of winning the case."); see also COLVIN, supra note 31.
140 Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The ArbitrationEpidemic, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/thearbitration-epidemic/ (documenting repeat employers' advantages in arbitration).
141 Id.
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took the collective step of mobilizing for permanent disruption: forcing
employers to remove arbitration clauses from employment adhesion contracts.
One of the most impressive mobilization efforts was the "Google
Walkout for Real Change" on November 1, 2018.142 The walkout attracted tens of thousands of Google employees from offices around the
world, a week after a report from the New York Times exposed
Google's payment of $90 million to its former executive Andy Rubin,
who had faced credible allegations of sexual misconduct. 143 The global
protest began at 11:10 a.m. in Google's Tokyo offices and then spread to
Singapore, Haifa, Zurich, Berlin, London, Dublin, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Kirkland, and Chicago offices, among others. 44 The innovators listed five demands for Google, and at the top of the list was the
removal of the forced arbitration in cases of harassment and discrimina45
tion.

Julian D'Onfro & Michelle Castillo, Google employees aroundthe
world are walking out today to protest the company's handling of sexual misconduct, CNBC (updated Nov. 1, 2018, 6:05 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/0 1/google-employees-walk-out-in-protest-ofsexual-misconduct-handling.html.
143 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google ProtectedAndy
Rubin, the "FatherofAndroid," N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-sexual-harassmentandy-rubin.html?action click&module=Top%02OStories&pgtype=Homepage;
Daisuke Wakabayashi & Kate Conger, Google Workers Fume Over Executives'
PayoutsAfter Sexual HarassmentClaims, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/technology/sexual-hamssmentgoogle.html.
144 Hannah Rodriguez, Google Employees in Seattle, Kirkland Walk Out
Over Treatment of Women at Workplace, SEATrLE TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-google-employees-walk-outover-treatment-of-female-employees/; Emily Sullivan & Laurel Wamsley,
Google Employees Walk Out to ProtestCompany's Treatment of Women, NPR
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/01/662851489/google-employeesplan-global-walkout-to-protest-companys-treatment-of-women; Matthew
Weaver et al., Google Walkout: Global ProtestsAfter Sexual MisconductAllegations, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2018, 4:20 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/0 1/google-walkout-globalprotests-employees-sexual-hamssment-scandals
145 The organizers have five specific demands:
1. An end to Forced Arbitration in cases of hamssment and
discrimination.
2. A commitment to end pay and opportunity inequality.
3. A publicly disclosed sexual hamssment transparency report.
4. A clear, uniform, globally inclusive process for reporting
sexual misconduct safely and anonymously.
142
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In planning the walkout, the organizers at Google utilized the collaborative and open company culture to generate and gather comments
and suggestions internally from more than 1,000 employees, 146 condensing the vast pool of ideas into the list of five demands. 47 They used
Google technology to connect, scale, and build the movement for their
rights as tech workers. 48 Overall, the innovators leveraged their skills in
designing, building, and marketing Google
tech products to serve and
49
sustain their workers' rights movement.
The innovators at Google also leveraged their talent capital, as they
knew that compared to the general workforce across sectors, tech workers have better and more bargaining power. 50 Tech companies compete
fiercely for talent, while collaborating with one another in recruiting and
hiring it.' 5 ' Tech workers know that they are in high demand: employers
cannot risk losing talented tech workers in droves. 5 2 In organizing the
walkout, tech workers at Google were able to amplify their strength
through collective action in order to push their demands to manage53
ment. 1
The success of the organizing efforts culminated in the Google executives' response two weeks after the walkout. 54 Google agreed to re-

5.

Elevate the Chief Diversity Office to answer directly to
the CEO and make recommendations directly to the
Board of Directors. In addition, appoint an Employee
Representative to the Board.
Sullivan & Wamsley, supra note 144.
146 Manjoo, supra note 1256.
147 See Sullivan & Wamsley, supra note 144.
148 Nitasha Tiku, Google Wanted to ProhibitWorkers From Organizing by
Email, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2019, 3:04 PM), https://www.wired.comlstoiy/googlewanted-prohibit-workers-organizing-by-email/; see Sullivan & Wamsley, supra
note 144.
149 See Sullivan & Wamsley, supra note 144.
150 Id.
151 See Jeff John Roberts, Tech Workers Will Get Average of $5, 770 Under
FinalAnti-PoachingSettlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-anti-poach-order/.
152 Manjoo, supra note 126 ("[T]he tight labor market gives [tech workers]
greater leeway in voicing their concerns, and the promise that their voices are
valued gives them an expectation that they can effect change.").
153 Manjoo, supra note 126.
154 Sharon Florentine, Google Employee Walkout Results in ForcedArbitrationPolicy Change, CIO (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:30 AM),
https://www.cio.com/article/3322836/google-employee-walkout-results-inforced-aibitration-policy-change.html; Shirin Ghaffary & Rani Molla, Tech
Companies Like Google are Giving Workers the Right to Take Sexual Harassment Claims to Court But Employees are Callingfor More, VOX (Nov. 19,
2018, 1:44 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/19/18095426/google-sexualharassment-forced-arbitration-claim-workplace-lawsuit-sue.
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move its arbitration provision for sexual harassment cases. 155 Following
in Google's footsteps, other tech companies like Airbnb, eBay, Square,
and Facebook subsequently removed 1forced
arbitration clauses in sexual
56
harassment and sexual assault claims.
Recognizing that removing forced arbitration only for sexual harassment and sexual assault claims was insufficient to help all tech workers, a group of thirty-five organizers at Google pressed for further
change. 57 When 2019 arrived, the organizers embarked on a new campaign with a focus on "Ending Forced Arbitration" on all claims in all
employment contracts. 158 The coordinators took to social media to educate others about the need to end forced arbitration in all claims, including sexual harassment, assaults, and discrimination cases pertaining to
sexual orientation, sex, race, gender identity, age, and ability. 159 By
March 21, 2019, five months after the walkout, Google removed forced
arbitration clauses from their employment contracts.16
In organizing tech workers, the Google walkout planners were fully
aware that the majority of tech workers for Google actually work as inSee id.
Ghaffary & Molla, supra note 154. Google, however, was not the first in
the tech industry to end mandatory arbitration clauses for sexual harassment
claims. A year before, in 2017, Microsoft ended forced arbitration for sexual
harassment claims. See also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber EliminatesForced
Arbitrationfor Sexual Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-sex-misconduct.html
(reporting Uber ended its arbitration requirement only for sexual assault or harassment claims for its employees, drivers and riders, but refuses to remove arbitration requirement "for other legal claims, like discrimination."); Wingfield &
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 139.
157 Megan Rose Dickey, Google Employees Demandthe End ofForcedArbitrationAcross the Tech Industry, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/10/google-employees-demand-the-end-offorced-aibitration-across-the-tech-industry/.
158 Googlersfor Ending ForcedArbitration
Launch PublicEducation campaign via Social Media, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://blog.usejournal.com/googlers-for-ending-forced-arbitration-launchpublic-education-campaign-via-social-media-e46d7608cd0e.
159 Dickey, supra note 157; Krista Gmelick Google Workers Keep Up
Fight on ForcedArbitrationAfter Walkout, BLOOMBERG (Jan 15, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/google-workers-keepup-fight-on-forced-arbitration-after-walkout./.
160 See generally Kim Elsesser, Google Ditches MandatoryArbitrationPolicy, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2019/02/22/google-ditchesmandatory-arbitration-policy/#5fO2fa4e5alf; Nitasha Tiku, Google Ends
ForcedArbitrationAfter Employee Protest,WIRED (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/stoiy/google-ends-forced-arbitration-after-employeeprotest/ (reporting that Google went beyond what the company had initially
removed mandatory arbitrations for sexual harassment claims).
155
156
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dependent contractors. 161 At Google, the total workforce consists of
121,000 temporary workers and contractors, but only 102,000 full-time
employees. 162 In the tech sector, temporary workers and contractors constitute half of the workforce. 163 As the shadow workforce, independent
contractors are the second-class citizens of the tech sector. 164 With an
inclusive vision, the walkout directors demanded the removal of forced
arbitrations for contractors, alongside full-time employees. 165 The organizing efforts brought unprecedented results: in May 2019, Google removed forced arbitration from contracts with contractors who work directly for Google. 66
The victory in dismantling adhesion contracts in the tech sector
came at a cost. Google targeted more than 300 employees in retaliation
after the walkout. 1 6 7 The company went after Claire Stapleton, one of the
walkout organizers, by demoting her from her role as a marketing manager and demanding that she take a medical leave. 168 Another organizer,
Meredith Whittaker-the leader of Google's Open Research-was told
that her employment at Google would be "changed dramatically. ' i' 69 The
retaliation culminated in the departure of Claire Stapleton after months
of retribution and interference. 170 But their sacrifices significantly shifted

Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google's Shadow Work Force: Temps Who Outnumber Full-Time Employees, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019),
161

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-temp-workers.html
(reporting Google contractors and temporary workers receive lower pays and
less benefits but face sexual harassment from Google managers).
162 Id.
163 Id. (reporting tech companies save $100,000 "a year on average per
American job" per worker by using temps and contractors).
164 Manjoo, supra note 127 (stating that the organizers at Google "include
points of view of that have long been marginalized in tech-of minority workers, for instance, and of contractors, the industry's second-class citizens.").
165 Manjoo, supra note 126.
166 Dickey, supra note 157.
167 Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Employees Say They
FacedRetaliationAfter OrganizingWalkout, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/technology/google-walkout-employees-

retaliation.html.
168 Conger & Wakabayashi, supra note 167
169 Id.; e.g., Dickey, supra note 157 (reporting that Whitetaker was not allowed to "continue her work as before").
Alexia Femndez Campbell, A Google Walkout OrganizerJust Quit,
Saying She was Branded with a "ScarletLetter," VOX (June 7, 2019),
170

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/7/18656562/google-walkoutorganizer-stapleton-quits; Julia Carrier Wong, 'I've Paida Huge Personal
Cost": Google Walkout OrganizerResigns Over Alleged Retaliation,THE
GUARDIAN (June 7, 2019),

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/j un/07/google-walkoutorganizer-claire-stapleton-resigns.
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V. BEYOND CONTRACT THEORY OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
In a very short time, innovators have successfully forced their companies to remove mandatory arbitration clauses from their employment
contracts. On the other hand, for decades, contract scholars, judges, and
other advocates relied unsuccessfully on the doctrine of unconscionability to reign in the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. In other words, through collective organizing efforts, the innovators have achieved a significant milestone in employment contract reform that was previously impossible. Their victory casts doubt on the
effectiveness of the unconscionability doctrine as a policing tool in adhesion employment contracts.
A. A BriefHistory of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine
Under contracts law, the primary tool for judges to regulate adhesion contracts is the doctrine of unconscionability. 72 Many scholars
have documented the history of the unconscionability doctrine,' 73 but for
this Article's purpose, a brief history of the doctrine is sufficient.
Unconscionability existed at common law to avoid outrageously
unfair contracts. As Justice Frankfurter asserted years ago, "The fundamental principle of law that the courts will not enforce a bargain where
one party has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities and distress of the other has found expression in an almost infinite variety of

See generally Thomsen, supra note 119 (explaining how the tech wokers movement has emboldened others to step up in ending forced arbitration for
sexual harassment claims).
172 See, e.g., Lany A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rick A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability:An EmpiricalStudy of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
1067, 1087-88 (2006) (recognizing unconscionability as the "primary policing
doctrine"); see also Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 233, 254 (2002) (stating that unconscionability has become the "most common" judicial tool in policing adhesion contracts).
173 See Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 232-33 (Mass. 1992) ("The
doctrine of unconscionability has long been recognized by common law courts
in this country and in England."); see also A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts:A ComparativeStudy of the Approaches in England,
France,Germany and the United States, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455,
498-99 (1992) (a comparative history of unconscionability in contracts law);
see generally Cellini & Wertz, UnconscionabilityContractProvisions:A History of UnenforceabilityfromRoman Law to the U.C.C., 42 TUL.L. REV. 193
(1967); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionabilityin California:A Needfor Restraint
and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 466-71 (1995) (providing a history of
unconscionability).
171
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cases."' 74 The application of the doctrine began primarily in equity rather
than law. The court could refuse to enforce a contract when an overreaching party with great bargaining power had rendered the terms patently unfair. 1 75 Later, with the incorporation of unconscionability provision in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, unconscionability
176
became a valid legal argument.
As modem procedural rules merged law and equity, courts expanded and recognized unconscionability as a defense in non-U.C.C. cases. 77
As of today, the doctrine of unconscionability splits into procedural and
substantive components. As the names suggest, procedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the contract was formed, the tactics and any high-pressure sales pitches used, any unequal bargaining

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942)
(Fmnkfurter, J., dissenting).
175 See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Serv., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1995) ("Tra174

ditionally, equity courts recognized the defense of unconscionability in denying
relief to plaintiffs who were guilty of unconscionable conduct ....Because
barring relief was a matter of the chancellor's discretion, equity never developed
a clear set of rules for analyzing claims of unconscionability ....Additionally,
in equity unconscionability served as a remedial doctrine, limiting a party's
remedies without truly affecting its substantive legal rights."); see also State ex
rel. King v. B&B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014) ("Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine, rooted in public policy, which allows courts to
render unenforceable an agreement that is unreasonably favorable to one party
while precluding a meaningful choice of the other party." (citation omitted)).
176 See Maxwell, 907 P. 2d 51, 57 ("However, the enactment of an unconscionability defense under U.C.C. Article 2 changed that. The rule as it now
exists is largely substantive, working primarily as a defense both in law and in
equity and applying to claims for damages as well as specific performance.");
see also U.C.C. § 2-302 ("Unconscionable Contact or Clause (1) If the court as
a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contact without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contact or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination."); see
generally M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability:A
New Frameworkfor U.CC.Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 42 (1981);
Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code the Emperor'sNew Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 543-46 (1967) (acritique and defense of the U.C.C.'s
unconscionability provision).
177 See Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1979) ("We hold that
the defense of unconscionability is available in any contact action. The trial
court erred in holding otherwise.").
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power exerted, or any undecipherable terms utilized.'7 8 Substantive unconscionability refers to contracts with overly harsh, oppressive terms
that shock the conscience.' 79 For example, substantively unconscionable
contracts contain extreme price terms compared to the actual value of the
goods sold or services offered, unjustifiably high financing costs, and a
lack of buyer's remedies. 80
Courts decide as a matter of law whether a contract or its particular
term is unconscionable at the time of formation.' 8' The assessment on
unconscionability is a case-by-case basis.18 2 Typically, to prevail on the
unconscionability grounds, the party asserting the doctrine must prove
178

See Waters, 587 N.E.2d 231 (affirming unconscionability determination

where there was clear overreaching and oppression and gross inadequacy of
consideration in the transfer of annuity with disproportionally large value in
exchange for very little amount); see also Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure ofE-StandardTerms Backfire?,
104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 854 (2006) ("Procedural unconscionability involves the
manner in which the contract was made and regulates situations resembling,
among other things, duress, misrepresentation, or, most important here, an unfair presentation of the terms.").
179 See Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enter., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1199 (Wash.
2013) ("A term is substantively unconscionable where it is 'one-sided or overly
harsh' ... '[s]hocking to the conscience' ... 'monstrously harsh' ... or 'exceedingly calloused."') (citation omitted); see also Leff, supra note 176, at 48586.
180 See generally Frank P. Darr, Unconscionabilityand PriceFairness,30
Hous. L. REv. 1819 (1994) (applying unconscionability in policing price fairness in contacts); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand lts Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1982) (advocating for a much greater application of
the doctrine beyond price fairness); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class,Personality,
Contract,and Unconscionabiliy,35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 445, 450 (1994).
181 See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of unconscionability, closely allied as it is to fraud and duress, is designed to prevent overreaching at the contract-formation stage."); see also Day v. CTA, Inc., 324 P.3d
1205, 1209 (Mont. 2014) ("A contact is unconscionable if it is a contract of
adhesion and if the contactual terms unreasonably favor the drafter.").
182 See Fotomat Corp. of Florida v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) ("Florida has long recognized the principle that the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom or folly of contracts ...but where it is perfectly
plain to the court that one party has overreached the other and has gained an
unjust and undeserved advantage which it would be inequitable to permit him to
enforce, a court will grant relief even though the victimized parties owe their
predicament largely to their own stupidity."); see also Res. Mgmt, Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985) (recognizing
that unconscionability "defies precise definition" but "the standard for determining unconscionability is high, even if not precise"); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing
Unconscionability'sSafety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REv. 73 (2006) (arguing
that unconscionability is necessarily flexible and contextual in order to both
meet its function of protecting core human value).
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both procedural and substantive unconscionability in order to obtain relief' 8 3 The remedy
is either the nonenforcement or limited enforcement
18 4
of the contract.
B. Arbitration Clauses and Unconscionabilityin Employment
Contracts
As concerns about mandatory arbitration provisions in employment
contracts grew in light of the Supreme Court's string of employerfriendly decisions,"" contract law scholars and litigants championed the
doctrine of unconscionability as a way to challenge the enforceability of

Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119. 1134 (1lth Cir. 2010)
("Our review of Florida law confirms the district court's interpretation of Florida law as requiring a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability."); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir.
2003) (" [A] contract to arbitrate is unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability when there is 'both a procedural and substantive element of unconscionability."); In re DiMare, 462 B.R. 283, (D. Mass. Bankr. 2011); Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 (Cal. App. Ct. 1997) ("The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be
present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability."); Basulto v. Hialeah
Automotive, 141 So.3d 1145, 1159 (Florida 2014) ("We agree with our district
courts of appeal that procedural and substantive unconscionability must be established to avoid enforcement of the terms within an arbitration agreement.
However, we conclude that while both elements must be present, they need not
be present to the same degree."); Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d
915, 922 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2002) (reviewing New Jersey cases on unconscionability and concluding that the New Jersey Supreme Court has "clearly
included both the procedural and substantive unconscionability concepts" in
evaluating contract unconscionability); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ND, 693
N.W.2d 918, 924 (N. Dakota 2005) ("We agree with the majority of courts
which have addressed the issue and hold that a party alleging unconscionability
must demonstrate some quantum of both procedural and substantive unconscionability."); Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. V. Estes, 810 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2012) ("A detennination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability that is analyzed on a case-by-case
basis."); Coady v. Cross Country Bank, 729 N.W.2d 732. 741 (Wis. Ct. App.
2007) ("A determination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both procedural and substantive unconscionability that is analyzed on a case-by-case basis.").
184 See Stephen E. Friedman, Giving UnconscionabilityMoreMuscle: Attorney 'sFees as a Remedy for ContractualOverreaching, 44 GA. L. REv. 317
(20 10) (advocating for the inclusion of attorney's fees as a remedy in cases
where courts find unconscionability and arguing that the lack of adequate remedy undermines unconscionability's effectiveness).
185 See supra notes 37-45.
183
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arbitration agreements. 186
Indeed, some litigants have identified potential issues of procedural
and substantive unconscionability in mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. 18 7 These issues include an employee's inability to
negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement before signing, a lack of
clarity in language of the agreement, an absence of remedies, no real
consideration provided by the employer, and excessive costs borne by
the employee.'8 8 Likewise, scholars have focused on unconscionability
as a counterweight to the enforceability of arbitration provisions in employment contracts.' 89 Some believe that unconscionability is the "defense of choice" against arbitration agreements in employment con-

tracts. 190
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947); see also Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622
(2018) (stating that the Federal Arbitration's saving clause "permits agreements
to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability") (citation omitted).
187 See, e.g., Douglas 0. Smitk The Future of Employee Collective Action
Waivers, 91 Wis. LAW. 32, 35 (2018) ("Issues of procedural and substantive
unconscionability could include 1) the inability of the employee to negotiate
concerning the terms of the arbitration agreement and the collective action
waiver, including having insufficient time to review and to evaluate the agreement before being made to sign; 2) any ambiguity or lack of understandability
of the language of the agreement and waiver; 3) lack of consideration given by
the employer, 4) limitations of liability or of remedies that would be available in
court under the employment statutes included in the scope of the arbitration
agreement; and 5) excessive costs borne by employees that would make the
arbitration process effectively unavailable to employees.").
188 See id.; see also Menaka N. Fernando & Jennifer S. Schwartz, Tackling
ForcedArbitration,54 AM. ASS'N FOR JUST. (2018) (identifying issues to challenge forced arbitration in employment context).
189 See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionabilityto Employment ArbitrationAgreements, With Emphasis on ClassAction/Arbitration
Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REv. 665, 670-71 (2009-2010) (reviewing how five
state courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability to determine whether
to enforce employment arbitration agreement); see also Michael Schneidereit,
Note, A Cold Night: Unconscionabilityas a Defense to MandatoryArbitration
Clauses in Employment Agreements, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 991 (2004).
190 Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent JudicialSkepticism of the ClassArbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 477,
489-90 (2009) ("Unconscionability, a general state law defense to contracts,
became the defense of choice in early cases contesting arbitration clauses in
employment or consumer agreements."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,and Equilibrium: The Return of UnconscionabilityAnalysis as
a Counterweight to ArbitrationFormalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757,
766, 799 (2004) (noting the increase in judicial embrace of unconscionability to
counter arbitration agreements and asserting that the upsurge "appears to be
activated in part by the excesses of opportunistic legal actors attempting to capi186
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Despite the reliance of litigants and scholars on unconscionability
in challenging arbitration clauses, judges have not responded positively
to the unconscionability argument in this context. 191 For instance, in Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an arbitration clause in the employment contract was
unconscionable as a matter of law. In that case, the contract compelled
the employee to submit all disputes to arbitration, but allowed the employer unilateral choice in pursuing arbitration or litigation. 192 Plaintiff
Sablosky, a commission-based real estate salesman, alleged that he sold
the Exxon Building in Midtown Manhattan and was denied his commission. 193 The employer compelled arbitration, and Sablosky sought to
permanently stay arbitration 194 while arguing that the arbitration clause
was unconscionable. 195 The Court ruled against him, reasoning that an
.employer, who may hire hundreds of employees, should be able to protect itself from the delays and costs of extensive litigation by including
as a condition of employment an agreement by the employee to arbitrate
claims rather than litigate them. ' 1 96 The Court also rejected Sablosky's
argument on procedural unconscionability. The Court observed that "almost all" employment contracts are prepared by the employer, and that
"circumstance cannot render the arbitration clause contained in the contract unconscionable. '' 19 7 In other words, the imbalanced arbitration

talize on problematic legal doctrine" established in the Supreme Court's proarbitration cases).
191

See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, UnconscionableJudicialDisdainfor Unsophis-

ticated Consumers andEmployees' ContractualRights? Legal and Empirical
Analysis of Courts 'MandatoryArbitrationRulings and the Systematic Erosion
of Proceduraland Substantive UnconscionabilityDefenses Under the Federal
ArbitrationAct, 1800 2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143 (2016). Nevertheless,
there are some cases where courts declined to enforce arbitration upon scrutinizing the tenns of the arbitration clauses. See Baxter v. Genworth N. Am. Corp.,
16 Cal. App. 5th 713, 723-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming the lower court's
finding that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable in a case
where the employee "had no opportunity to negotiate the tenns of the [arbitration] program." The court deemed that the employee had not had any meaningful choice in the matter and found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable); see also Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377,
382-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the arbitration agreement in the present case
of employment contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
192 Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. 1989).
193Id. at 644.
194

Id.

195 Id.

Id. at 647.
Id. ("Nor do we accept plaintiffs claim that the contract is one of adhesion or that it results from procedural unconscionability in the contact formation process. Such claims are judged by whether the party seeking to enforce
196
197
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clause became a standard term in employment contracts.
On the opposite coast, even though California courts are more sympathetic to the unconscionability defense in employment arbitration contracts, they still favor arbitration for resolving disputes. Illustratively, the
Supreme Court of California in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.'9 8 held that
the standard form contract between a music promoter and a musician,
which required arbitration of disputes between the parties by presumptively biased arbitrators, was unconscionable.' 99 In that case, the standard form contract contained a provision that dictated the designated arbitrator be someone who favored one party.2° In other words, while
arbitration by a biased arbitrator is unconscionable, arbitration itself as
the required method of solving disputes is not unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court ordered upon remand that the parties select a suitable
arbitrator to decide their dispute. 20 ' Notably, the Scissor-Tail court em-

the contract has used high pressure tactics or deceptive language in the contract
and whether there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties.").
198

Daniela Camso, ContractLaw and Distributionin the Age of Welfare

Reform, 49 ARIZ. L. REv. 665, 677 (2007) ("Within the Ninth Circuit, the tendency to invalidate arbitration clauses on grounds of unconscionability is most
pronounced."); Erin O'Hara O'Conor et. al., Customizing Employment Arbitra-

tion, 98 IOWAL. REv. 133, 138 (2012) ("In California, state courts have struck
down arbitration clauses that on their face require both parties to bring their
claims to arbitration but then carve out from arbitration claims that are likely to
be brought by the employer. Given that California is often a leader in state efforts to regulate unfair arbitration provisions, its stance on this issue could well
spread to other states."). For a critique of California courts' application of unconscionability, see Stephen A. Broome, An UnconscionableApplication of the
UnconscionabilityDoctrine:How the CaliforniaCourts are Circumventing the
FederalArbitrationAct, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39 (2006) (showing that "uncon-

scionability challenges before the California appellate courts succeed with far
greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration
agreement"); Steven J. Burton, The N\ew JudicialHostility to Arbitration:Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability,andAgreements to Arbitrate,
2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 469, 486 (2006). See also Susan Randall, JudicialAttitudes TowardArbitrationand the Resurgence of Unconscionability,52 BUFF. L.
REv. 185, 207-09 (2004); Stempel, supra note 190, at 799-802.
199 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1990).
200 Id. at 178 ("[I]t must be concluded that a contractual provision designat-

ing the union of one of the parties to the contract as the arbitrator of all disputes
arising thereunder including those concerning the compensation due under the
contract does not achieve the 'minimum levels of integrity' which we must demand of a contractually strctured substitute for judicial proceedings.").
201Id. at 180 ("h light of the strong public policy of this state in favor of
resolving disputes by arbitration, however, we do not believe that the parties
herein should for this reason be precluded from availing themselves of nonjudicial means of settling their differences ....
We therefore conclude that upon
remand the trial court should afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to agree
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phasized that "strong public policy" of
the State of California is "in favor
2 2
of resolving disputes by arbitration., 1
In summary, as long as the forced arbitration clause does not violate
procedural unconscionability, and the clause does not contain harsh
terms in violation of substantive unconscionability, courts will enforce
the mandatory arbitration agreement.20 3 That means employees cannot
challenge their employers for imposing forced arbitration clauses as per
se unconscionable.2 4 In other words, the unconscionability doctrine is an
ineffective means for employees seeking to stay arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Seeking judicial redress in voiding employment arbitration clauses
via unconscionability has proven futile, wasteful, and costly to employees. Enforceable arbitration agreements continue to constitute a significant portion of today's employment contracts, privatizing disputes,
maintaining secrecy, perpetuating wrongdoings, and depriving employees' constitutional and substantive rights .2 05 But if forced arbitration in
adhesion contracts is "left unchecked," as a prominent contracts scholar
has warned, we will face a situation that where we solve our problem in
"much the same way as the Austrians in the 1938 Anschluss solved their
Nazi problem: by handing over the keys to the city. '"206
The innovators forged a different path. They were not naive enough
to embrace the futile route of unconscionability claims. They did not
seek judicial redress to stay arbitration. Instead, they brilliantly opted for
collective organizing action, demanding that their employers remove
enforceable arbitration agreements from their contracts. They have
achieved the improbable by policing and correcting employers' wrongs
extra-judicially, gaining back their constitutional and substantive rights
in the process.

on a suitable arbitrator and, failing such agreement, the court should on petition
of either party appoint the arbitrator.").
202 Id. at 180. See also Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (finding substantive unconscionability because the arbitration in the present case required the employees but not the employers to arbitrate claims).
203 See Li, supra note 189, at 671 (reviewing how five state courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability to determine whether to enforce employment arbitration agreement).
214 Knapp, supra note 24, at 781 ("Courts entertaining challenges to arbitration have steadfastly declined to entertain the notion that imposing arbitration
on an unwilling party could be unconscionable per se.").
205 Knapp, supra note 24, at 781-89 (identifying problems with mandatory
arbitration in adhesion contrcts).
216 Id. at 789.

200

Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law

[Vol. 26:3

